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At the Lectern

Teaching Comparative Perspectives
in the Domestic Constitutional Law
Class: A Step-by-Step Primer
Mark S. Kende

I. Introduction
Comparative constitutional law has become more popular in the last
decade. Questions have arisen about whether, and how, to integrate such
comparative perspectives into domestic constitutional law classes so that all
students are exposed to such approaches, not just those who take upper level
seminars. The relevance of international human rights law has also come up.
The AALS has held symposia on these topics, and various approaches have
been advocated.1 Professors Brian Landsberg and Leslie Jacobs have written
an impressive short book, intended for use as a supplement by American law
professors, entitled Global Issues in Constitutional Law.2 Some scholars, however,
have undoubtedly not pursued such avenues given the numerous domestic
topics to be covered and possible student resistance.
This essay seeks to reduce these concerns by providing a short step-by-step
description of how to integrate comparative perspectives into an American
constitutional law survey class with brevity. Law professors in other countries
1.

Every issue of Volume 58 of the Journal of Legal Education for 2008 has at least one article
addressing comparative perspectives. Moreover, the theme for the 2003 Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools was “Legal Education Engages the World.” See
also David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law, 36 Yale Int’l L. J.
1, 46 (2011) (“Comparative constitutional law has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the
last ten years.”). Harvard Law School added an international law/comparative law option
to the first year J.D. curriculum. Harvard Law School, The New 1L Curriculum, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/careers/ocs/employers/about-our-students/the-new1l-curriculum.html. Of course, comparative constitutional law and international human
rights law are distinct fields, yet the latter has certainly influenced the former.

2.

Brian Landsberg & Leslie Jacobs, Global Issues in Constitutional Law (West 2007).
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can use this method to integrate American or other perspectives. The key is
to raise at least one foreign perspective per major course topic. This essay will
also demonstrate that foreign law does not have a “liberal” bias as alleged by
some scholars.3
II. Step by Step Integration
A. The “Structural” Constitution
The typical first American constitutional law course focuses on the U.S.
Constitution’s “structural” aspects: judicial review, separation of powers,
legislative authority, federalism, and executive power. Most U.S. casebooks
start with Marbury v. Madison.4 A professor can readily contrast American-style
judicial review with that in the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Canada.
The UK Westminster system rejected judicial supremacy for parliamentary
supremacy. The professor can argue in favor of the UK system by pointing
out that many Americans believe that the courts infringe on democracy. Even
the relatively new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom cannot invalidate
primary legislation from Parliament.
In France, one function of the Conseil Constitutionnel is to advise Parliament on
whether legislation about to be implemented would be constitutional. This role
contrasts with the U.S. Constitution’s case or controversy requirement. One
can support France by saying that a proposed law’s constitutionality should be
assessed in advance to avoid uncertainty and huge litigation costs. Other recent
dramatic developments in French constitutional review could likewise merit
examination. The teacher could also discuss how Canada’s “notwithstanding”
clause acts as an escape hatch from the “counter-majoritarian” difficulty that
obsesses American constitutional law.
To summarize, instead of asking one more Socratic hypothetical, why
not substitute mention of at least one comparative constitutional alternative
and elicit student reactions? During discussions about the U.S. Supreme
Court, one can pose questions regarding the wisdom of life tenure, which is
internationally unique, as well as about the U.S. judicial confirmation process.
Surprisingly, my students often favor life tenure even when I describe it as
unpopular abroad. One can contrast the U.S. confirmation approach with a
judicial commission alternative, such as in South Africa, which may reduce
politicization. Then there’s the issue of whether it’s better to have a supreme
court or a constitutional court.
3.

See, e.g., Michael Dorf, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: A Revealing
Colloquy Between Justices Scalia and Breyer, FINDLAW, Jan. 19, 2005, available at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050119.html (referencing Justice Antonin Scalia’s view that
foreign law is cited in gay rights and death penalty cases but not in the abortion area where
other nations are more conservative).

4.

5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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On separation of powers, American law professors can reference the English
approach where cabinet ministers sit in Parliament. Then there are the broader
questions of parliamentary vs. presidential systems.
Regarding executive power, France’s endorsement of broad presidential
immunity (which came up while President Chirac was in office) is a useful
counter to the American approach embodied in Clinton v. Jones.5 The Jones
reasoning that such litigation will not interfere with the president now seems
naive. Executive power in many nations has been boldly asserted because of
the “war on terror.” Courts throughout the world have therefore had numerous
issues to address. Several U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject, such as
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 require discussion of international human rights norms.
Another instructive case is Missouri v. Holland 7 where the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a law enforcing a Migratory Bird Treaty. The Court reasoned
that Congress may have broader power to pass laws implementing treaties
than otherwise. This case allows discussion of monist v. dualist approaches
to treaties, the relevance of international conventions to domestic law, state’s
rights, executive powers, etc. One can also discuss whether Congress would
have such enhanced power pursuant to a multi-lateral treaty.
Basic sovereignty and federalism questions can be compared internationally.
In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,8 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
state imposed Congressional term limits. The Court divided closely on the
source of sovereignty in the U.S.—whether it resides with the people or the
states. It’s amazing that this issue was still debated almost 200 years after
McCulloch v. Maryland,9 where the Court supported the constitutionality of the
Bank of the United States. This American debate can be compared to Canada,
which dealt with secession related to Quebec, and to Hong Kong. Hong Kong
is labeled a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) but it has far more autonomy than any mainland province. Hong
Kong has a Bill of Rights, a relatively independent high court, etc. There is an
underlying dispute, however, over whether Hong Kong’s sovereignty derives
from the British-Chinese Treaty of 1993 or from the PRC Constitution.

5.

520 U.S. 681 (1997).

6.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

7.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).

8.

514 U.S. 779 (1995).

9.

17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Professors interested in teaching about the U.S. Supreme Court’s actual
use of foreign law in recent constitutional cases can focus on Justice Stephen
Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United States.10 The majority ruled that Congress
illegally commandeered state law enforcement officials by enacting a federal
law requesting state assistance with background checks on gun purchasers.
In dissent, Justice Breyer relied on Switzerland as a system in which local
authorities regularly assisted the national government. Yet, several legal
scholars convincingly argued that Breyer did not fully appreciate the Swiss
system.11 Even Breyer admitted in a speech that he regretted citing a Zimbabwe
case in an opinion. Conservatives and liberals can find plenty of ammunition
in these cases.
B. The “Rights” Constitution
On individual rights issues, the U.S. Supreme Court often invokes three
levels of scrutiny: rationality, intermediate, and strict. Yet scholars have pointed
out that the Court actually employs many gradations.12 In the affirmative action
case, Grutter v. Bollinger,13 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor claimed she was using
strict scrutiny but actually deferred to the university. Moreover, the Court in
Lawrence v. Texas14 said it was using rationality review yet struck down the law
prohibiting gay sex.
My students usually notice this level of scrutiny problem quickly and are
puzzled by it. I therefore ask whether it would be better to have a system of
European or Canadian proportionality in which the Supreme Court explicitly
weighs interests in a more nuanced fashion. Usually my students backpedal.
They say that the American system is better because proportionality gives too
much discretion to judges. Again, conservative scholars might be pleased by
this pro-American reaction to foreign law.
Of course, there are numerous differences between the U.S. and foreign
nations in particular rights areas. Most nations reject the death penalty. On
equal protection, many countries endorse substantive equality rather than
American formalistic equality. Equality cases in India focus on caste and class,
not race.
10.

521 U.S. 898 (1997).

11.

See e.g., Rick Hills, Is Breyer’s pro-commandeering argument in Printz the worst comparative
constitutional law argument ever?, Prawfs Blawg, Sep. 9, 2008, available at http://www.
typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341c6a7953ef00e554f3feaa8833.

12.

See e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation 111 (Greenwood Pub. Group 2001)
(discussing Randall Kelso’s view that the Court has at least six levels of scrutiny); Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481 (2004).

13.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

14.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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On religion, many countries are less separationist because their constitutions
lack an Establishment Clause. This is another way that foreign law may support
conservative results. Indeed, there is little doubt that U.S Establishment
Clause doctrine is confusing.
Regarding free speech, Internet cases provide a host of opportunities to
discuss differing foreign approaches especially on hate speech, pornography,
commercial speech (gambling), etc. A professor can discuss the famous
case where Bavaria briefly forced the American company Compuserve to
remove sexually explicit sites, or the more recent Yahoo! case involving Nazi
memorabilia advertised in France. These both address the “race to the bottom”
problem.
One can also contrast the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of socioeconomic rights with South Africa’s Constitutional Court decisions.15 Or
one can describe how India’s Constitution makes such rights “aspirational,”
though their Supreme Court has gone farther. Similarly one can contrast the
U.S. Supreme Court’s DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,16
finding no affirmative duty to protect, with provisions in the German Basic
Law, or with the South African Constitutional Court’s decision in Carmichele v.
Minister of Safety and Security.17
Perhaps the most dramatic comparison involves interpretive method.
Originalism has a unique power and significance in the American system
which it lacks in other countries. One can offer views from these other countries
about why originalism has not taken hold.18 Inevitably such views delve
into the most fundamental questions about different legal systems. Even if
particular students will not practice or teach constitutional law, this knowledge
of other systems can be beneficial in their international interactions, whether
in business, in life or over the Internet.
Lastly, professors can employ a novel teaching technique to help integrate
foreign law. During my first class on American constitutional rights, I write
a list of possible rights on the front board (ranging from the right to own a
gun, the right to freedom of religion, the right to housing, and so on). I then
ask the students to break into small groups and rank the rights in importance.
During class-wide discussion, I ask the groups to share their justifications.
15.

See, e.g., Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 SACLR Lexis
126. See generally Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the
United States 243–285 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009)

16.

489 U.S. 189 (1989).

17.

2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).

18.

Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes
and Contrasts, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 633, 656–663 (2004).
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When students mention less common rights, I will highlight their foreign
judicial sources. We do this exercise before reading any U.S. Supreme Court
rights cases.
In sum, one can integrate foreign law perspectives into domestic
constitutional law classes in ways that do not take much time and that benefit
the class, especially in this era of globalization. Students painlessly learn about
diverse normative possibilities. Moreover, I put the Landsberg & Jacobs book
and various comparative constitutional law casebooks (Tushnet & Jackson;
Dorsen & Rosenfeld19) on reserve for those who may be interested in further
reading.

19.

Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2d ed. Foundation Press
2006); Norman Dorsen, et al., Comparative Constitutionalism (2d ed. West 2010).

